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Abstract
We consider the allocation of corporate control in a company with two large and a contin-
uum of small shareholders. Control is determined in a shareholders’ meeting, where the large
shareholders submit competing proposals in order to attract the vote of small shareholders.
The presence of multiple shareholders reduces private benefits through competition for control.
In the optimal ownership structure, the more eﬃcient blockholder will hold just enough shares
to gain control, but a large fraction of shares is allocated to the less eﬃcient shareholder in
order to reduce rents. We investigate when the large shareholders would want to trade parts
or all of their share blocks among them, and show that the concern about retrading will lead
to a larger than optimal stake of the controlling shareholder.
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1 Introduction
Since Berle and Means (1932), the central conflict of interest in the modern corporation was seen
as opposing employed managers and dispersed shareholders, and this view was tacitly extended
to the world outside the United States. But the idea of shareholder dispersion was increasingly
at odds with more accurate documentation of corporate ownership patterns, which showed that
in virtually every country other than the US and the UK, the vast majority of large publicly
traded companies have large shareholders, often with controlling share blocks.1 Consequently,
the research agenda has recently broadened to address the conflict between large shareholders
and minority shareholders. Symptomatic for this trend, Johnson et al. (2000) suggest that
problems of “tunneling”, the term they propose to generally describe “the transfer of resources
out of a company to its controlling shareholder”, are endemic in civil law countries.
But for all the new emphasis on the role of large shareholders, another misconception may
yet have taken hold of the discussion, namely the idea that the typical ownership structure pits
a single large (and presumably controlling) shareholder against a sea of dispersed shareholders,
each endowed with too small an equity stake to wield significant influence. This picture has
dominated the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of large shareholders since the
seminal contributions of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985).2
Recent empirical literature on ownership structure, however, shows that many large companies
have several shareholders with significant blockholdings. In eight out of nine of the largest stock
markets in the European Union, the median size of the second largest voting block in large publicly
listed companies exceeds five percent, according to results of the European Corporate Governance
Network;3 and in Germany, the only exception on this list, between 25 and 40 percent of listed
firms have two or more large shareholders (Becht and Boehmer (2000), Lehmann and Weigand
(2000)). Perhaps most surprisingly, in the United Kingdom, long seen as the country with the
least shareholder concentration, the size of the second and third largest blocks appears to be
larger than in the European average. By contrast, for NYSE and NASDAQ-listed corporations
in the United States, significant voting blocks apart from the largest share stake are apparently
much rarer (Becht and Mayer (2000)).4
The objective of this paper is to investigate the structure of corporate governance and the al-
location of corporate control in the presence of multiple large shareholders. We see three principal
1See for example empirical work by Franks and Mayer (1995) for a number of European countries and more
recently by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) for a larger group of countries.
2For example, Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1993), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Maug (1998), Burkart,
Gromb and Panunzi (1997, 1998, 2000) and Burkart and Panunzi (2001).
3This list includes Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Austria. See
Becht and Mayer (2000).
4But for smaller companies in the US, the concept of multiple shareholders is present as well: 58 % of closely
held corporations have a second significant shareholder (Gomes and Novaes (2000)).
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motivations behind this research.
First, it pertains to the understanding of corporate governance mechanisms outside the United
States. Confronted with this reality, empirical researchers have used various measures of ownership
concentration, but, in the words of LaPorta et al. (1999, p. 476), “a theoretically appropriate
measure requires a model of the interactions between large shareholders, which we do not have.”
Our paper aims to contribute to the filling of this gap.
Second, such a model is also interesting because the coexistence of several blockholdings
frequently occurs by design rather than historical accident. After their IPO, many young firms
have several large owners, for example founders, venture capitalists, or corporate allies. And
in privatizations, governments often bring in a number of strategic investors, along with the
wide dissemination of the stock among the general public and employees. As an illustration,
the Spanish government first sold substantial equity blocks of Iberia, the national air carrier, to
two categories of strategic shareholders, to domestic banks representing local roots and to airline
alliance partners British Airways and American Airlines to bring in industry clout,5 two years
before the privatization was completed with an IPO in April 2001.
Third, as institutional investors try to become active shareholders in the hope of stimulat-
ing firm performance, the question is how successfully they can challenge the control of large
incumbent shareholders.6
We analyze the strategic interplay between the various blockholders on the one hand, and
between any of the blockholders and small shareholders on the other hand, and the consequences
for corporate performance and shareholder value. We limit the analysis in this paper to the case
where two blockholders compete for eﬀective control in a company. In our model, the allocation
for control is decided by a vote, which is interpreted as the vote for the composition of the board
of directors in a shareholders’ meeting. The two large shareholders submit competing proposals
to the vote, and small shareholders will only vote if they are suﬃciently relevant, in view of the
cost of participation. In order to lure small shareholders and assemble a majority of votes, the
two large shareholders can pledge to limit the private benefits of control they will take. The
relative merit of the proposals also depends on the shareholders’ specific competence to develop
the company’s strategy.
We investigate this triangle of strategic interactions in order to find answers to the following
questions: What is the relationship between small shareholders and multiple blockholders who are
competing for control, and who will seize corporate control? Is the competition between multiple
5 Interestingly, another block was set aside for employees, an aspect which we do not address in the current
paper.
6For the frontrunner of this strategy, the Californian public sector pension fund CalPERS, the influence on
corporate control seems to be well-documented. The findings on performance improvement are mitigated at best
(Smith (1996), Romano (2000)), in contrast to evidence that ownership concentration and the involvement of large
shareholders improve peformance, for example by Ang et.al. (2000) for smaller US companies, and by Claessens
et.al. (2000) for Asian economies.
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share blocks successful in limiting “tunneling”? What is the optimal ownership structure of a
company in an initial share sell-oﬀ, say in an IPO or a privatization? Is the design of multiple
share blocks a stable structure, or would subsequent trading of blocks or on the stock exchange
be likely to alter the ownership structure? Should we expect large shareholders to really compete
for control, or are they rather likely to collude against small shareholders?
Our key results are as follows. The relevant concept of control power is the contestability
of the incumbent shareholder’s position, and not just ownership concentration. In analogy to
the contestable markets concept7, we say that corporate control is contestable if the incumbent
cannot increase the level of control rents without losing control in a control contest. We suggest
that contestability is a useful concept to predict the identity and allocation of control and the
capacity to extract benefits depend in fact on contestability. The maximum rent extraction under
contestable control is determined by two factors, the shareholders’ ability to create value when in
control on the one hand and the relative size of their blocks on the other hand. Both factors are
substitutes, so rents decrease as the controlling shareholder loses appeal as a wealth creator or as
her block decreases in size relative to the competitor’s. The design of the ownership structure can
exploit this in order to minimize control rents, and allocate a relatively larger block to the less
eﬃcient shareholder in order to make the competition more equal. But if the more competent
shareholder can provide monitoring services at suﬃciently lower costs, then the shareholder in
control should also be the largest shareholder.
In an extension, we consider the possibility that large shareholders trade parts or their en-
tire blockholdings between them. By merging the blocks in a block trade, competition can be
mitigated, so at first glance this appears to be attractive for the large shareholders. But block
mergers may in turn imply that the company value is reduced, because the blockholders comple-
ment each other in creating value. We show that multiple blocks will only coexist if ownership is
substantially concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder, and more concentrated than
appears desirable in our analysis of the optimal share allocation.
Our model leads to additional empirical implications. Based on contestability, we propose a
simple measure of the concentration of voting power as the diﬀerence in size between the leading
blocks, normalized by the free float. Multiple blockholders are more likely if they belong to
diﬀerent categories of shareholders. Contestability of control, and not ownership concentration
per se, should determine firm performance. The optimal size of the largest block is increasing in
the free float, but the size of the controlling block is only increasing in the free float if heterogeneity
about monitoring skills is important. Our analysis shows that the conventional idea of multiple
shareholders acting as substitutes for poor legal protection of dispersed shareholders is incomplete.
When the legal protection is weak, then the deadweight losses that shareholder competition help
7 In essence, a market in industrial economics is (perfectly) contestable if no entrant can cut the price and make
a profit when supplying the equilibrium quantity (Baumol et al. (1982)).
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to avoid are usually less important , and multiple shareholders may be less beneficial than with
strong protection. Our analysis suggest that block premia can be used to identify whether control
is associated with a block.
Two other recent papers have recently explicitly addressed the issue of competing blocks. In
Gomes and Novaes (2000), there are two blockholders sharing control. The consequence is less
tunneling, but also a risk to miss out on valuable projects due to their internal disagreement.
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) take for granted that a controlling coalition of shareholders will
be formed. The winning coalition is the minimal coalition garnering a majority of votes, and the
larger it is, the less private benefits will it extract at the expense of minority shareholders.
In these two papers, multiple shareholders exercise control jointly, whereas our model is cen-
tered around the contestability of a single controlling shareholder. All three papers have in
common the idea that the presence of multiple shareholders imposes limits on the extraction of
private benefits. Our contribution to this literature is to consider simultaneously a strategic role
of blockholders and of dispersed shareholders, within an explicit voting contest.8 Moreover, our
paper is innovative in introducing shareholder heterogeneity and showing that the competence
of large shareholders is a second independent dimension, besides voting power, determining the
allocation of control. We also suggest new approaches to the analysis of block trading.
Related themes of multiple large shareholders have also been visited in other work. Pagano
and Roell (1998) suggest that multiple blocks commit the firm to protect minority investors. A
number of papers argue that multiple blockholders are unlikely to emerge. In Zwiebel’s (1995)
general equilibrium model, investors are sorting such that only one of them holds a block in any
given firm, precisely because they want to eschew the sort of competition over benefits that we
model. Winton (1993) emphasizes the free-rider problem in monitoring eﬀorts among multiple
large shareholders. Similarly, in Bolton and von Thadden’s (1998) liquidity-control trade-oﬀ,
multiple large shareholders would increase the liquidity costs without oﬀering compensating ad-
vantages in monitoring.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is laid out. Section 3 contains
the basic analysis of the bidding strategies and the voting outcome. The determinants and the
comparative statics of the optimal ownership structure are investigated in Section 4. In Section
5, we analyze the conditions of retrading-proofness vis-a-vis block trades. Empirical implications
are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
8By contrast, in Gomes and Novaes (1999) there is no role for minority shareholders whereas Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon (2000) do not consider a non-cooperative interaction of the large shareholders.
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2 The Model
We analyze a control contest in a company with two large blockholders, i = 1, 2, and a continuum
of small shareholders, s ∈ [0, 1]. The company could be either privately held or publicly listed.
Prior to the contest, the ownership structure of the firm is chosen by the initial owner of the
firm. We suppose that the initial seller of the firm (a founder-entrepreneur, a venture capitalist,
a company spinning oﬀ assets, or a government privatizing state enterprises) seeks to partition
the equity blocks in order to maximize proceeds. We denote by α1 and α2 the fractions of shares
owned by the two large shareholders, and by α¯ the total amount of shares sold as blocks to the
large shareholders, α¯ = α1 + α2. The remainder of the shares, 1 − α¯, are distributed uniformly
among the small shareholders.
A shareholders’ meeting is convened in order to allocate control power. At the meeting, each
of the two large shareholders proposes a plan to run the company. The plans describe measures
that the controlling shareholder will implement in order to limit her control power and to protect
the interests of minority shareholders (large and small). We suppose that the large shareholders’
plans can be summarized by the maximal amount of private benefits that they can capture if they
control the firm, denoted B1 and B2. The proposals limiting the control benefits to B1 and B2
are binding commitments that will be enshrined in the company charter and cannot be revoked
by the board. There is an upper limit B¯ that B1 and B2 cannot exceed.
The extraction of private benefits Bi results in a linear value loss to the company of γBi.
The parameter γ indicates how easy it is to for a controlling shareholder to convert company
resources into private resources. Hence, the parameter γ can be interpreted as a measure of
the legal protection of minority shareholders, with larger values of γ corresponding to a better
protection of minority interests, as in Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000) and Burkart and Panunzi
(2000) for example. We assume γ > 1 to capture the idea that benefit extraction is costly for the
shareholders as a whole.
The allocation of control power to one of the two large blockholders results from a vote of
all the shareholders of the company, small and large. The allocation of control power should be
understood as the vote for the composition of the board of directors. Assuming that the number
of seats in the board is uneven, the outcome of the shareholders’ vote will be an unequivocal
allocation of control power to one of the two large shareholders. Each share carries one vote, and
the controlling shareholder is elected by simple majority of the votes eﬀectively cast.9 While the
two large shareholders always participate in the meeting, the attendance of small shareholders is
not guaranteed. Specifically, we assume that small shareholders incur a cost to participate in the
9 In order to break ties, we assume that when the two plans receive the same number of votes, the winning
shareholder is the one who receives the largest number of votes of small shareholders. If each receives the same
number of votes of small shareholders, the eﬃcient shareholder wins the contest.
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meeting. This cost represents not only the transportation and opportunity cost of attending the
meeting (which could be alleviated by proxy voting), but also the cost of gathering and processing
information about the two large shareholders’ types and proposals at the meeting. Diﬀerent small
shareholders have diﬀerent voting costs, and we assume that the distribution of voting costs of
small shareholders is uniform on [0, 1].10
The winning shareholder’s use of her control powers is an important determinant of firm value.
The two large blockholders diﬀer in their ability to add value to the company when in control. We
represent this ability by a parameter θi, called competence, which captures all of a shareholder’s
attributes that translate control into value, for example her capacity to define and implement the
company’s strategy. We let θ1 and θ2 denote the competence of the two shareholders when they
control the firm and assume, without loss of generality, that Shareholder 1 is more competent
than Shareholder 2, θ1 ≥ θ2. The diﬀerence in competence is denoted ∆θ = θ1 − θ2.
Once the vote has taken place, and the winner of the control contest is chosen, the two large
shareholders provide monitoring eﬀorts e1 and e2. They incur convex monitoring costs given
by c1(e1) = c1 e
2
1
2 and c2(e2) = c2
e22
2 . Finally, the value of the firm is realized. The firm value
is a simple additively separable function of the shareholders’ monitoring eﬀorts, the controlling
shareholder’s competence level, and the private benefits extracted by the controlling shareholder,
v = θi + e1 + e2 − γBi .
Our assumption that both shareholders can add value through monitoring services is motivated
by the idea that shareholders of diﬀerent types and expertise may share in the ownership of a
company, for example families, banks/financials or institutional shareholders, alongside corporate
owners, which again are diﬀerent if they are unrelated or horizontally or vertically related. There
is evidence in support of this idea. Boehmer (2000) finds that multiple shareholders improve the
performance of takeover decisions of German listed companies, but only if one shareholder is a
bank and the other shareholder a family or a corporate owner, not if both are of the same type.
Also, corporate shareholders with close industry knowledge may play a particular value-enhancing
role, as we hinted in our example of the Spanish air carrier Iberia. Allen and Phillips (2000) show
that over half of all corporate block acquisitions are made by firms in related industries, and that
the entry of corporate blockholders leads to large and significant value gains, especially if the
blockholder has also direct industrial ties.
We assume throughout that the total amount of shares sold as blocks to the two large share-
holders, α¯ , is exogenously given. This will arise whenever the initial seller of the firm first chooses
the amount of shares floated to the general public, and then decides how to partition equity blocks
among the two large shareholders. The initial seller’s decision on the number shares sold to the
10This is the aggregate voting cost of a mass of 1 of small shareholders, i.e. a mass just suﬃcient to hold the
entire company. If there are N small shareholders each holding one share, each would bear 1/N of this cost, where
we consider N →∞ in our continuous limit.
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general public is not explicitly modeled here. It could result, for example, from a motivation to sell
shares to the small shareholders in order to increase the market liquidity for the stock. A more
liquid stock gives direct benefits to the company like a higher transparency and informational
accuracy, and is likely to be reflected in a liquidity premium in the stock valuation. Alterna-
tively, the initial seller may pursue a “Machiavellian objective” as in Biais and Perotti (2001),
and choose to sell shares to the public in order to influence their future decisions. While we
account for the possibility of block trades between the large shareholders (Section 5), we assume
that α¯ remains fixed throughout, so the large shareholders do not sell or buy stock on the open
market. In support of this assumption, we refer to the argument that large shareholders should
normally find it in their interest to stick to the existing ownership structure, since changes in their
holdings will lead them to endogenously adjust their monitoring eﬀorts, an eﬀect which should be
rationally anticipated in the stock valuation and forestall trading (Burkart et al. (1997)). Also,
large shareholders should take the trade-oﬀ between liquidity and control into account, since the
large shareholders themselves will value the exit option that the liquidity of the stock grants to
them (Bolton and von Thadden (1998)).
In order to make the analysis interesting, we suppose that neither of the two large shareholders
is initially oﬀered a majority stake in the company, α1 < 12 and α2 <
1
2 and that the controlling
shareholder always has an incentive to extract private benefits, for any split of the ownership
structure, 1− γα¯ > 0.
Our model thus incorporates two diﬀerent sources of heterogeneity among the two large block-
holders: they may diﬀer in their competence to run the company θ1 and θ2, and in their monitoring
costs, c1 and c2. Another (endogenous) source of heterogeneity stems from the distribution of
shares, α1 and α2. As we will see in the next sections, these asymmetries play a fundamental role
in the determination of the firms’ value and the optimal ownership structure.
-
ownership
structure
chosen
blockholders
bid
B1, B2
voting
decides on
control
eﬀorts
e1, e2
chosen
value v
realized
Figure 1: Time Line
t
Figure 1 illustrates the time line of the model. We proceed to solve the model by backward
induction. Section 3 analyzes the outcome of the control contest and the determination of the
private benefits and the company’s value, for a fixed ownership structure (α1, α2). Section 4
considers the optimal ownership structure chosen by the initial seller seeking to maximize the
firm’s value.
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3 Control Contests
3.1 Optimal Levels of Monitoring
At the last stage of the model, the two large blockholders choose their monitoring eﬀort levels
in order to maximize their utility levels. We adopt the convention to denote the controlling
shareholder as blockholder i, and the non-controlling shareholder as shareholder j. The utilities
are given by
Ui = αi(θi + ei + ej) + (1− γαi)Bi − ci
e2i
2
Uj = αj(θi + ei + ej)− γαjBi − cj
e2j
2
.
As the firm’s value is additively separable in all its terms, the optimal monitoring eﬀorts are
independent of the identity of the controlling shareholder and the private benefits. They are given
by the first-order conditions of the utility functions as
e∗i =
αi
ci
, e∗j =
αj
cj
.
Substituting back these optimal eﬀort levels, the utilities of the two large shareholders and of the
small shareholders can be rewritten directly as a function of the ownership structure (α1, α2) as
Ui = αi
µ
θi +
α1
c1
+
α2
c2
¶
+ (1− γαi)Bi −
α2i
2ci
Uj = αj
µ
θi +
α1
c1
+
α2
c2
¶
− γαjBi −
α2j
2cj
Us = (1− α¯)
µ
θi +
α1
c1
+
α2
c2
¶
− γ(1− α¯)Bi .
3.2 Voting Equilibrium
At the voting stage of the model, all shareholders evaluate the proposals B1 and B2. A rapid
inspection of the payoﬀs of the three types of shareholders shows that the eﬃcient shareholder
(Shareholder 1) always prefers her plan, B1, to the plan of the other shareholder. Shareholder
2 prefers her plan if and only if (1 − γα2)B2 + γα2B1 ≥ α2∆θ. Hence, if the diﬀerence in
competence is high enough, the ineﬃcient blockholder prefers to give control of the company to
the other blockholder. Small shareholders favor the plan of the eﬃcient shareholder if and only if
γ(B1 −B2) ≤ ∆θ. Figure 2 graphs the preferences of the second large shareholder and the small
shareholders in the plane (B1, B2). Notice in particular that when Shareholder 2 prefers the plan
B1, the small shareholders also prefer the plan of the eﬃcient blockholder.
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The equilibrium strategies of the two large blockholders are easily characterized. As there are
only two alternatives, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each blockholder to vote for her preferred
plan. On the other hand, small shareholders face a coordination problem, as their participation
to the meeting is costly, and their ability to influence the outcome of the vote depends on the
participation decisions of other small shareholders. To solve this coordination problem, we restrict
our attention to strong equilibria of the voting game, i.e. equilibria such that no group of agents
with positive measure has an incentive to deviate.11
B1
B2
Small prefer  B2
Small prefer  B1
2 prefers  B2
2 prefers  B1
γ
θ∆
Figure 2: Preferences
Since voting is costly, it is a dominant strategy for small shareholders not to participate in
the meeting when their preferences agree with those of the largest blockholder. Furthermore, a
situation where both large blockholders prefer the plan B1 but small shareholders prefer the plan
B2 can never arise. Hence, the only case where the vote of small shareholders matters is when
they favor the plan of the smallest blockholder. We are thus left with two cases to consider: (i)
one where α2 ≤ α1 and small shareholders prefer B2 to B1 and (ii) one where α1 ≤ α2 and small
shareholders prefer B1 to B2.
The first case (α2 ≤ α1) is illustrated in Figure 3A.12 Shareholder 2 wins the contest if and
only if she attracts the votes of a fraction α1−α21−α¯ of the small shareholders. This implies that the
plan B2 is adopted if and only if a fraction α1−α21−α¯ of the small shareholders has a voting cost κ
11See Aumann (1959) for this concept. We emphasize that we adopt a non-cooperative approach. The use
of strong equilibira is merely an equilibrium refinement in order to reduce the number of equilibria in the small
shareholders’ coordination problem, but does not indicate the use of cooperative game theory concepts. It indicates
that when the two large shareholders propose plans they anticipate the least favorable outcome (for the largest
shareholder) or the most favorable outcome (for the smallest shareholder).
12The formal proposition and proofs are given in the Appendix.
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satisfying13 θ2 − γB2 − κ ≥ θ1 − γB1 , or
κ ≤ γ(B1 −B2)−∆θ
As voting costs are uniformly distributed, this occurs if and only if α1−α21−α¯ ≤ γ(B1−B2)−∆θ,
or
∆θ
γ +
α1 − α2
γ(1− α¯) ≤ B1 −B2 .
Comparing Figure 2 with Figure 3A, we thus see that the region of plans (B1, B2) where
Shareholder 2 wins the contest can be obtained by a parallel shift of the line representing the
preferences of small shareholders. The ineﬃcient shareholder wins the contest only if the diﬀerence
in plans is high enough to overcome the cost of voting of a large enough fraction of the small
shareholders.
B1
B2
2 wins control
1 wins  control
γ
θ∆
)1(
21
αγ
αα
γ
θ
−
−
+
∆
Equilibrium
   E
Figure 3A: Voting Outcome if α1 > α2
Consider now the second case (α1 ≤ α2). By a similar reasoning, Shareholder 1 wins the
contest if and only if she attracts the votes of a fraction α2−α11−α¯ of the small shareholders. This
will arise whenever α2−α11−α¯ ≤ γ(B2 −B1) +∆θ, or
α2 − α1
γ(1− α¯) −
∆θ
γ ≤ B2 −B1.
Again, the voting costs of small shareholders induce a parallel shift of the line representing the
preferences of small shareholders. However, when the ineﬃcient shareholder has a larger fraction
of shares, this parallel shift may result in two configurations, depending on the exact position
of the crossing point of the new line representing small shareholders’ preferences and the line
13Recall that the voting cost κ is normalized to a unit mass of shareholders.
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representing the preferences of the second large shareholder. Figures 3B and 3C illustrate the two
possible subcases.
In Figure 3B, the two lines cross in the interior of the positive orthant. This defines two
connected regions where Shareholders 1 and 2 win the contest. In Figure 3C, the two lines cross
outside the positive orthant, and the regions where Shareholder 1 wins the contest are discon-
nected. Shareholder 1 either wins (for low values of B2) because all shareholders unanimously
agree on the plan B1 or (for high values of B2) because she manages to attract enough votes of
small shareholders to defeat the plan of Shareholder 2. However, there is an intermediate range of
plans B2 for which Shareholder 2 always wins the contest, as she prefers to vote against the plan
B1 and Shareholder 1 cannot attract enough votes to defeat the plan of the ineﬃcient shareholder.
B1
B2
2 wins control
1 wins  control
γ
θ∆
)1(
12
αγ
αα
γ
θ
−
−
−
∆
1 wins  control
2
2
1 αγ
θα
−
∆
E
Figure 3B: Voting Outcome if α1 < α2 and Shareholder 1 Wins Control
3.3 Control Contests
We now turn to the stage where the two large shareholders simultaneously choose the plans B1
and B2. The competition between the two large shareholders is reminiscent of a model of Bertrand
competition between firms with asymmetric costs (see Shy (1995) p.109), and, with the help of
Figures 3A, 3B and 3C, we can characterize the unique equilibrium values of the plans proposed
by the two large blockholders.
In Figures 3A and 3C, one of the two shareholders has a clear advantage over the other
(Shareholder 1 in Figure 3A and Shareholder 2 in Figure 3C). Each large blockholder seeks to
undercut her competitor, and the equilibrium is obtained when the disadvantaged shareholder
oﬀers a plan with zero private benefits (points E in the two figures). At this equilibrium, the
advantaged shareholder is able to extract strictly positive private benefits.14 The situation of
14Formally, as in a Bertrand model with asymmetric firms, this equilibrium exists only if there is a discrete money
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Figure 3B is more complex to analyze. As we show in the Appendix, the unique equilibrium
is obtained at point E, which is the maximal point at which Shareholder 1 wins the contest
irrespective of the choice B2. We summarize our findings in the following Proposition.
B1
2 wins control
1 wins  control
γ
θ∆
)1(
21
αγ
αα
γ
θ
−
−
+
∆
−
1 wins 
control
2
2
1 αγ
θα
−
∆
E
B2
Figure 3C: Voting Outcome if α1 < α2 and Shareholder 2 Wins Control
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose α1 ≥ α2 (Figure 3A). In the unique equilibrium of the control contest,
Shareholder 1 wins and extracts private benefits B∗1 = ∆θγ +
α1−α2
γ(1−α¯) . Shareholder 2 proposes B
∗
2 = 0.
(ii) Suppose α2 ≥ α1 and α2−α11−α¯ ≤
∆θ
1−γα2 (Figure 3B). In the unique equilibrium of the control
contest, Shareholder 1 wins and extracts private benefits B∗1 = ∆θγ −
(1−γα2)(α2−α1)
γ(1−α¯) . Shareholder 2
proposes B∗2 =
α2(α2−α1)
1−α¯ .
(iii) Suppose α2 ≥ α1 and α2−α11−α¯ >
∆θ
1−γα2 (Figure 3C). In the unique equilibrium of the control
contest, Shareholder 2 wins and extracts private benefits B∗2 = α2−α1γ(1−α¯)−
∆θ
γ . Shareholder 1 proposes
B∗1 = 0.
Proof: See the Appendix.
4 Optimal Ownership Structure
unit. As the smallest money unit tends to zero, the equilibrium converges to the point E.
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We now turn to the computation of the optimal ownership structure chosen by the initial
seller of the firm. We rewrite the value created by monitoring eﬀorts and the equilibrium cost of
monitoring as
V (α1, α2) =
α1
c1
+
α2
c2
, C1(α1) =
α21
2c1
, C2(α2) =
α22
2c2
.
We suppose that the objective of the initial owner is to maximize the total value of the firm for
all shareholders:
W = V (α1, α2)− C1(α1, α2)− C2(α1, α2) + θi − (γ − 1)Bi(α1, α2) ,
where i denotes the identity of the controlling shareholder.
Notice that the choice of the shares α1 and α2 aﬀects the total value of the firms through
two diﬀerent channels. On the one hand, the ownership structure determines the value created
by the monitoring eﬀorts of the two large shareholders, V (α1, α2) − C1(α1, α2) − C2(α1, α2) ;
on the other hand, the choice of α1 and α2 aﬀects the amount of private benefits, Bi(α1, α2),
extracted by the controlling shareholder. In general, the interplay between these two eﬀects is
very complex, and the optimal ownership structure is diﬃcult to characterize.15 Suppose for
instance that Shareholder 1 has a lower monitoring cost than Shareholder 2. The maximization
of the value created by monitoring eﬀorts would then prescribe to increase the share of the first
shareholder. If, however, Shareholder 1 is the controlling shareholder of the firm, this increase
results in an increase in private benefits and may reduce the total value of the firm. The global
eﬀect of an increase in the share of the first shareholder thus depends on the relative magnitude
of the eﬀects on the monitoring value and the private benefits.
Recall that the total amount of shares sold as blocks to the two large shareholders, α¯ , is
exogenously given.16 We can thus simply replace α2 = α¯ − α1. We recall that the monitoring
value of the firm is given by
V (α1, α2)− C1(α1, α2)− C2(α1, α2) =
α1
c1
+
(α¯− α1)
c2
− α
2
1
2c1
− (α¯− α1)
2
2c2
.
The private benefits can be computed as
15For arbitrary values of α1 and α2, the total value of the firm is neither a convex nor a concave function of the
ownership structure. Hence, we cannot use first order conditions to determine the optimal distribution of shares.
16Recall also the assumption that 1− γαi > 0 is satisfied. Otherwise, the initial seller could decide to sell a very
large fraction of shares to the controlling shareholder, who would then optimally decide not to extract any private
benefits.
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Bi(α1, α2) =



∆θ
γ +
2α1−α¯
γ(1−α¯) if 2α1 ≥ α¯
∆θ
γ −
(1−γ(α¯−α1))(α¯−2α1)
γ(1−α¯) if 2α1 ≤ α¯ and
(α¯−2α1)
1−α¯ ≤
∆θ
1−γ(α¯−α1)
(α¯−2α1)
γ(1−α¯) −
∆θ
γ if
(α¯−2α1)
1−α¯ >
∆θ
1−γ(α¯−α1)
.
Figure 4 graphs the monitoring value of the firm and private benefits as a function of the
share of the eﬃcient shareholder. We let αˆ1 and α˜1 denote the ownership structure maximizing
the monitoring value and minimizing private benefits respectively. Straightforward computations
show that, in the relevant range of parameters17,
αˆ1 =
c2 − c1 + c1α¯
c1 + c2
α˜1 =
3α¯
4
− 1
2γ +
1
4γ
£
(3γα¯− 2)2 + 8γ(α¯(1− γα¯)−∆θ(1− α¯))
¤ 1
2 .
It is immediate to check that, when c1 ≤ c2 (larger control competence is aligned with lower
monitor costs), α˜1 ≤ α¯2 ≤ αˆ1. Furthermore, oﬀering more than αˆ1 shares to Shareholder 1 is
ineﬃcient, as a decrease in the shares results both in an increase in the monitoring value and a
reduction in private benefits. Similarly, oﬀering less than α˜1 shares is a dominated choice, since
an increase in the number of shares increases the monitoring value and decreases private benefits.
Hence, the optimal distribution of shares necessarily lies in the interval [α˜1, αˆ1] and Shareholder
1 ultimately gets control of the firm. However, as noted above, the computation of the optimal
distribution of shares α∗1 in the interval [α˜1, αˆ1] is a diﬃcult exercise, as the objective function is
a highly irregular function of the variable α1 and the parameters ci, ∆θ, α¯ and γ. In order to gain
some understanding of the optimal distribution of shares and its relation to the parameters, we
distinguish between two polar cases: (i) one where the two firms are identical in their competence
(∆θ = 0) but diﬀer in their monitoring costs (c1 ≤ c2), and (ii) one where the two firms have
identical monitoring costs (c1 = c2 = c) but diﬀer in their competence (∆θ ≥ 0).
4.1 Heterogeneous Monitoring Costs
When the two shareholders have equal competence to control ∆θ = 0, then α˜1 = α¯2 , so we can
without loss of generality restrict our attention to the case α¯2 ≤ α1 ≤ αˆ1. The total value of the
firm is then given by the expression:
17 In order to construct Figure 4 and to compute the values maximizing monitoring and minimizing private
benefits, we restrict parameters so that αˆ1 and α˜1 assume interior values in the interval [0, α¯].
14
Private
Benefits
V - C1 - C2 ,
Bi(α1,α2) 
1
~α
2
α
B2
1αˆ
Monitoring 
Value
1α
α
B1
Figure 4: Monitoring Value V − C1 − C2 and Private Benefits Bi(α1, α2) as a Function of α1
W = α1c1
+
α¯− α1
c2
− α
2
1
2c1
− (α¯− α1)
2
2c2
+ θ1 −
(γ − 1)(2α1 − α¯)
γ(1− α¯) .
The objective of the initial seller is to select α1 ∈ [ α¯2 , αˆ1] in order to maximize the total
value W of the firm, which is a strictly concave function of α1. Depending on the value of the
parameters, the optimal choice can either be an interior solution,
α∗1 =
c2 − c1 + α¯c1
c1 + c2
− (γ − 1)2c1c2γ(c1 + c2)(1− α¯)
,
or a corner solution, α∗1 = α¯2 or α∗1 = αˆ1 = α¯.18
To understand the nature of the optimal ownership distribution, we analyze the comparative
statistics with respect to the key parameters ci, ∆θ, α¯ and γ. From the perspective of comparative
corporate governance, α¯ (capturing ownership dispersion) and γ (measuring the diﬃculty to
transform company resources into private resources, or the level of institutional protection of
small shareholders), appear to be particularly interesting.
The comparative statics of the parameters c1 and c2 can easily be obtained, as they only aﬀect
the interior solution. A reduction of the monitoring cost of Shareholder 1 increases the amount of
shares of the eﬃcient shareholder in the optimal monitoring outcome and yields an increase in the
amount of shares sold to her. Finally, in the relevant range (that is taking α∗1 ≥ α¯2 ), an increase
18As the interior solution always satisfies: α∗1 ≤ αˆ1, the only case where the upper bound is reached is when
α∗1 = αˆ1 = α¯.
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Figure 5: Heterogeneous Monitoring Costs: Optimal α1 as a Function of α¯
in the monitoring cost of Shareholder 2 also increases the shares of the eﬃcient shareholder in the
optimal monitoring outcome and results in an increase in the number of shares sold to Shareholder
1.
The analysis of the parameter γ is straightforward for the same reason. An increase in γ, the
cost of extracting benefits, makes the equilibrium level of benefit extraction more costly for the
initial seller, who loses γ − 1 times the benefit. Thus, the seller becomes less tolerant to control
rent taking, and this reduces the optimal amount of shares sold to Shareholder 1, in order to
increase competitive pressure on benefits.
The eﬀect of changes in α¯, the total volume of blockholdings, can be characterized as well,
but is a bit more intricate. Starting at α¯ = 0, there must be an interval where any diﬀerence
in the size between the two large shareholders is so small in absolute terms that it can be easily
neutralized by the small shareholders, and hence B1 ≈ 0. Thus, there must a region for small α¯
where only the monitoring value eﬀect counts and where the optimal structure is to sell all the
shares to the most eﬃcient shareholder, α1 = α¯. Next, for the curve of interior solutions α∗1(α¯),
we observe that
dα∗1
dα¯ =
c1
c1 + c2
− (γ − 1)2c1c2γ(c1 + c2)(1− α¯)2
< 1
2
.
Thus, along this curve, the holdings of Shareholder 1 relative to Shareholder 2 are strictly decreas-
ing. Moreover, this curve has a smaller slope than the two boundaries that delimit the area where
corner solutions obtain (α¯ and α¯/2 respectively). In the intermediate region, the emphasis shifts
from the monitoring to the control rents eﬀect and a small, but increasing fraction of shares is
assigned to the second shareholder. Finally, for α¯ = 1, we find that the lower boundary α¯/2 must
be binding, since the curve of interior solutions then takes on negative values. Fur high values
of α¯, the control benefits eﬀect becomes dominant and imposes the equal split. In conclusion,
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there are always three regions for the comparative statics of α¯, and as α¯ increases, the size of α1
relative to α2 is (weakly) decreasing: it is constant in the lower and upper region, where corner
solutions obtain, and strictly falling in the intermediate region. The reason for the fall is that a
decrease in α¯ means less free float, so the diﬀerence between the large shareholders must decrease
in order to maintain competitive pressure on benefits.
Figure 5 plots the optimal distribution of shares, α∗1 against α¯ for typical parameter values
(γ = 1.5, c1 = 0.1, c2 = 0.2), showing an example where in a parameter range of the intermediate
region, the absolute number of shares sold to the largest shareholder is decreasing with α¯. This
is certainly a surprising result, but based on a clear intuition: the need to give more power to
Shareholder 2 becomes more and more important, and so much so that at some point Shareholder
1’s absolute holdings must decline, until the lower bound α¯/2 is hit. This model also presents
a very natural explanation (in the upper region of values of α¯) of why we may observe that
blockholders hold blocks of equal size, even if their monitoring skills diﬀer.
4.2 Heterogeneous Competence
We now turn to the second polar case, where the two large shareholders have the same monitoring
costs, c1 = c2 = c, but diﬀer in their competence θi. In that case, αˆ1 = α¯2 and we can restrict our
attention to values α˜1 ≤ α1 ≤ α¯2 . The total value of the firm is then given by
W = α¯c −
α21
2c −
(α¯− α1)2
2c + θ1 +
(γ − 1)(1− γ(α¯− α1))(α¯− 2α1)
γ(1− α¯) −
(γ − 1)∆θ
γ .
The objective function is strictly concave in α1. Hence the optimal ownership structure is
either given by the interior solution
α∗1 =
α¯γ(1− α¯) + 3cγ(γ − 1)α¯− 2c(γ − 1)
2γ[c(γ − 1) + (1− α¯)]
or by a corner solution, α∗1 = α˜1 or α∗1 = α¯2 .
Comparative statics on the eﬀects of the parameters c and ∆θ are easily obtained, as in the
previous subsection, because the parameter c only aﬀects the interior solution, and ∆θ the bound-
ary value α˜1. An increase in the monitoring cost c lowers the share of the controlling shareholder,
as it increases the eﬀect of private benefits extraction. An increase in the asymmetry between
the two shareholders’ competence level reduces the lower boundary α˜1. For low values of ∆θ,
this boundary will typically be binding. The eﬀect of private benefits extraction is predominant.
Hence, as private benefits are increasing in the diﬀerence in competence, the initial seller should
reduce Shareholder 1’s block in order to reduce private benefits, so α1 is decreasing in ∆θ. As ∆θ
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Figure 6: Heterogeneous Competence: Optimal α1 as a Function of γ
increases, the lower boundary ceases to be binding. Reducing the share of the eﬃcient shareholder
to decrease private benefits now becomes too costly, and it is not optimal any longer to squeeze
equilibrium benefits B1 to zero. The optimal ownership structure then becomes independent of
∆θ.
The eﬀect of an increase in the controlling shareholder’s ability to extract private benefits,
γ, is more complex, since γ aﬀects both the lower boundary α˜1 and the interior solution α∗1.
The relationship is not always monotonic, as it was the case of heterogenous monitoring costs.
At γ = 1, the lowest level of protection from expropriation, the optimal ownership structure is
α∗1 = α¯/2, the maximum among all candidate values. In fact, Shareholder 1’s fraction of shares
reaches its global maximum at γ = 1, since α∗1 < α¯/2 for all γ > 1. We also verify that α∗1 is
strictly decreasing in γ around the lower bound γ = 1. But this relationship is non-monotonic:
At the upper bound γ = γmax = 1α¯ ,19 the internal solution α∗1 is increasing in γ. This does
not mean, however, that Shareholder 1’s fraction of equity is necessarily increasing for large γ,
since the lower corner solution α∗1 = α˜1 may already have been reached earlier, especially if ∆θ
is small. Note that this corner boundary solution α˜1 is always strictly decreasing in γ as long as
α˜1 > 34 α¯−
1
2γ , for which suﬃcient conditions are α˜1 <
α¯
4 or α¯ <
2
3 . Overall, our results are that
a∗1 is decreasing in γ, as long as γ and ∆θ are not large. As the protection of small shareholders
increases, the initial seller should decrease the share of the controlling shareholder in order to
reduce the loss from private benefits extraction. For large γ and ∆θ, a∗1 may be increasing in
γ. In this case, the controlling shareholder internalizes the deadweight loss suﬃciently and the
19γmax = 1α¯ is the maximum value consistent with the assumption that the controlling shareholder always wants
to take private benefits.
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Figure 7: Heterogeneous Skills: Optimal α1 as a Function of α¯
competence eﬀect becomes dominant. Figure 6 plots the optimal ownership structure against γ
for a set of parameter values (c = 0.1 ∆θ = 0.1, α¯ = 0.5) where ∆θ is small enough for α˜1 to
become binding, and the relationship is therefore monotonically decreasing throughout.
The comparative statics of α¯ are simpler to characterize. The optimal number of shares of
the controlling shareholder increases with α¯, the total number of shares sold to the two large
blockholders. When this number is very low, it is optimal to assign zero shares to the controlling
shareholder, as the small shareholders will nevertheless put her in control of the firm. When the
fraction of shares sold to the two large blockholders becomes large enough, the initial planner
should sell exactly α˜1 shares to the eﬃcient shareholder, or choose the ownership structure is
chosen in order to eliminate the extraction of private benefits. We observe that the upper boundary
α¯
2 is never reached, i.e. it is never optimal to split the shares equally if the two shareholders have
identical monitoring costs. On the other hand, there is a range of parameters for which the lower
boundary α˜1 is reached: the initial seller chooses the ownership structure in such a way that
private benefits are minimized. Overall, the block size of Shareholder 1 relative to Shareholder 2’s
block increases with α¯. Figure 7 shows the optimal ownership structure against α¯ for parameter
values comparable to those used before (c = 0.1 ∆θ = 0.1, γ = 1.5).
4.3 Synopsis
We have, in each round of the preceding analysis, eliminated one of the sources of blockholder
heterogeneity that drive the solution in the overall trade-oﬀ as depicted in Figure 4. The most
conspicuous diﬀerence is as to the block size of the controlling shareholder, who holds the larger
block when monitoring costs are important and the second block when control competence is
important. This diﬀerence is not really surprising: The reason for the controlling shareholder to
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be set on the minority block is to compensate for her edge in competence, and absent that reason,
she should be majority owner, provided she has also the lower monitoring costs.
It is then easy to see that in any intermediate scenario between the two extreme cases of
heterogeneous monitoring costs and heterogeneous control competence, the attribution of the
majority block simply depends on the comparative diﬀerence between the two blockholders, along
the two dimensions of heterogeneity.
The comparative statics show interesting diﬀerences: First, while the block size of Shareholder
1 is mostly decreasing in γ, which we can interpret to measure diﬀerences in the degree of legal
protection of small shareholders, an important exception emerges for large γ and ∆θ. A positive
correlation between the controlling shareholder’s block and legal protection indicates then that
heterogeneity in control competence is important. Second, the relative size of the controlling
shareholder’s block decreases in α¯ if shareholder heterogeneity concerns mostly the monitoring
eﬃciency, and it increases in α¯ if shareholder heterogeneity is mostly about control-specific at-
tributes. Since the shareholder in control has the smaller block in the latter case, we predict that
the relative size of the largest block always increases in the free float 1− α¯.
5 Block Trading
We have so far assumed that the initially fixed ownership structure will not be altered. In this
Section, we consider when a given ownership structure would be immune to retrading opportuni-
ties. This question is important for the seller, for if retrades are possible and the seller’s target
ownership structure is not viable, then the shareholders are initially willing to pay only prices
that reflect their value under the sustainable ownership structure. Recall that α¯ is exogenous in
this paper, so any share trades can only occur between the two large shareholders. Such trades
are commonly referred to as block trades, frequently negotiated separately from the market floor,
or “upstairs”. We consider such upstairs retrading, i.e. the price of the block transfer could be
freely negotiated between the large shareholders.
In order to economize on notation, we go back to the heterogeneous competence model, i.e.
c1 = c2 = c, and ∆θ > 0. We begin with the case where Shareholder 1 is initially endowed with
more shares than Shareholder 2, α1 > α2. The sum of utilities for the two large shareholders is
initially given by
U1(α1, α2) + U2(α1, α2) = α¯
³
θ1 +
α¯
c
´
− α
2
1
2c −
(α¯− α1)2
2c + (1− γα¯)
µ
2α1 − α¯
γ(1− α¯) +
∆θ
γ
¶
.
We consider first the case where one of the two large blockholders, say Shareholder 1, considers
a complete purchase of all shares from Shareholder 2. We assume that after selling out, Shareholder
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2 can still launch a bid (say from holding on to a single share, like a small shareholder), but her
position is then seriously undermined by the lack of voting power. Shareholder 1 faces no serious
competition in the control contest and is thus able to extract a benefit of B1(α¯, 0).20 The sum of
utilities obtained by the two large shareholders after the sale is thus given by
U1(α¯, 0) + U2(α¯, 0) = α¯
³
θ1 +
α¯
c
´
− α¯
2
2c + (1− γα¯)B1(α¯, 0) .
By comparing the sum of utilities obtained by the two large blockholders before and after the
sale, we obtain a simple condition when Shareholder 1 is not interested in buying Shareholder 2’s
entire block. This is the case if the combined utility would be reduced from the transaction, or if
(1− γα¯)
µ
B1(α¯, 0)−
2α1 − α¯
γ(1− α¯) −
∆θ
γ
¶
< α1(α¯− α1)c =
α¯2
2c −
(α¯− α1)2
2c −
α21
2c .
Notice that the left hand term in the above inequality represents the increase in private benefits
due to the absence of competition in the control contest. The right hand term corresponds to
the loss in value due to the increase in monitoring costs. The condition is obviously satisfied if
1−γα¯ > 0, that is if the free float is so unimportant that small shareholders would be automatically
protected by the remaining shareholder’s internalizing of the social cost of benefit-taking after the
sale. As the total amount of private benefits that can be extracted by the controlling shareholder,
B1, is reduced, the left hand term goes down, and the condition is more likely to be satisfied.
Similarly, if the diﬀerence in competence increases, then the private benefits initially extracted
by the controlling shareholder go up, and the inequality is more likely to be satisfied. As the
monitoring cost c goes down, the value loss due to the formation of a single block increases, and
the condition is more likely to be satisfied. Clearly, because of the competence diﬀerence, it is
even less attractive for Shareholder 2 to buy Shareholder 1’s entire block.
We also need to consider whether the two blockholders could benefit from a partial retrade
of their shares. To investigate this question, suppose there is any ownership structure (α01, α02)
diﬀerent from the initial distribution (α1, α2), which could be the result of such a partial share
trade among the two large shareholders. Again, this can only be the case if the combined utility
is larger after the trade than before, or if
U1(α01, α02) + U2(α01, α02) ≥ U1(α1, α2) + U2(α1, α2) .
Now for any such post-trade ownership structure (α01, α02), we need to take into account that
the benefits B1 will adjust to the change in ownership. We find the following conditions for an
allocation (α1, α2) to be immune against any retrading attempt on the upstairs market:
20B1(α¯, 0) = min
n
B¯, α¯γ(1−α¯)2 +
∆θ
γ
o
is determined by either the maximal amount B¯ or the highest benefits
that allow Shareholder 1 to win against the counter-bid of B2 = 0 of Shareholder 2 (who is now stripped of any
significant shareholding).
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Proposition 2 (Block Trading) If c1 = c2 = c and ∆θ > 0, then there is a unique allocation
(α1, α2) where there will be no partial or complete retrade of shares between the two blockholders,
given by
α1 = min
½
α¯
2
+
c(1− γα¯)
γ(1− α¯) ,
α¯
2
+
1− α¯
2
¡
γB¯ −∆θ
¢
, α¯
¾
,
α2 = max
½
α¯
2
− c(1− γα¯)γ(1− α¯) ,
α¯
2
− 1− α¯
2
¡
γB¯ −∆θ
¢
, 0
¾
.
Proof: See Appendix.
The finding in Proposition 2 can be intuitively explained as follows. For any reshuﬄing of
the ownership distribution, there are two eﬀects, an increase in the benefits B1 as well as a
repartition of the monitoring eﬀorts.21 As long as both eﬀects will be positive, a share sale will
occur. Therefore, a necessary condition for a retrading-proof ownership structure is that the
further repartition of the monitoring eﬀort has a negative eﬀect, or that α1 > α¯2 (because of the
assumption of equal costs, c1 = c2 = c). The more we move away from an equal distribution of
shares α1 = α2, the stronger this negative eﬀect. On the other hand, the eﬀect of Shareholder 1’s
share purchase on benefits B1 remains constant, as ∂ B1∂ α1 =
2
γ(1−α¯) . The retrading-proof ownership
structure is attained where the eﬀort repartition eﬀect and the benefit eﬀect are exactly oﬀsetting.
Now there are two cases: either this point is reached before the upper limit on benefits B¯ is
reached; then α1 = α¯2 +
c(1−γα¯)
γ(1−α¯) . Or the benefit eﬀect stills outweighs the repartition eﬀect when
B¯ is reached; in this case if α1 = α¯2 +
1−α¯
2
¡
γB¯ −∆θ
¢
. In the Appendix, we show that this
retrading-proof ownership structure is unique and always exists within the bound α1 ≤ α¯.
From a more empirical point of view, the most interesting finding is that a retrading-proof
ownership distribution always requires that α1 > α¯2 . This is in marked contrast to our analysis of
the optimal ownership structure, which for the case of identical monitoring costs (c1 = c2) requires
that Shareholder 2 should be majority owner, α˜1 ≤ α∗1 ≤ α¯2 , in order to oﬀset Shareholder 1’s
advantage of better control competence.
Thus, our analysis hints that the empirical finding that majority owners are typically in
possession of corporate control is a second best: It is not the optimal ownership structure, but
the only one robust to share-trading, implying that equilibrium benefit taking or tunneling is
considerable larger than under the optimal ownership structure.
6 Empirical Implications
We summarize the most important empirical implications that arise from our paper. When for-
mulating hypotheses for empirical work, we also need to take into account that retrading is a
21Recall that the sum of monitoring eﬀorts will always stay constant at e∗1 + e∗2 = α¯c .
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likely determinant of the ownership structures that are observed in reality. For a number of the
implications listed below, one needs to find proxies in order to put them to tests. For example,
heterogeneity in competence among shareholders could be proxied by subdividing the shareholder
sample into diﬀerent groups: corporate shareholders (which might be further distinguished ac-
cording to distance in terms of industry classification, or geographic distance / country of origin),
financial intermediaries and institutional investors, individuals and holdings, families.
• A satisfactory measurement of ownership concentration should take the contestability of
control into account.
Contestable control is the contribution of our model to the debate about the right measure
of shareholder concentration. From the viewpoint of contestability, the identity of the controlling
shareholder and the maximum control are derived from two independent dimensions, competence
and voting power. Competence is hard to capture empirically. But based on voting power
alone, the measure of shareholder power that comes out of our contestability model would be the
diﬀerence between the leading blocks, normalized by the free float, or α1−α21−α¯ . The same measure
can actually be in the presence of N > 2 blocks, as it is straightforward to extend our model. Even
if more than two blockholders can submit proposals, only the two strongest blockholders determine
the outcome (like in a second-bid auction). The equilibrium rent of the winning shareholder is
then determined by the value if everyone rallies against her. Therefore, we suggest to use as
the logical extension of our concentration measure max
n
α1−ΣNi=2αi
1−α¯ , 0
o
. We emphasize that a
satisfactory analysis of contestability should include measures of competence as well.
• Control benefits are smaller on average if multiple blockholders are present. Control benefits
are increasing on average in the diﬀerence in block size between the leading shareholders.
This implication follows easily since a single large shareholder holding α1 < 1/γ would always
take maximum benefits B¯. While control benefits are not directly observable, they might be
proxied by measures of corporate performance, as for example argued by Ang et al. (2000). In
our model, benefits are determined by the size diﬀerence α1 − α2 as well as by the competence
diﬀerence∆θ. Thus, to test this hypothesis, one needs again to control for competence diﬀerences,
for example by classifying shareholders into various groups.
Consistent with this hypothesis, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) report that, in a regression
of ownership variables on return on assets for German stock-listed companies, “the presence of
a strong second or third large shareholder enhances profitability.” Volpin (2001) investigates
the impact of ownership structure on top executive turnover in Italy; while the presence of a
strong minority shareholder does not increase the performance-sensitivity of executive turnover,
the presence of an explicit shareholder’s agreement among leading shareholders does.
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• If the leading shareholder is a particular good monitor, then it is more likely that there is
only a single share block. If monitoring skills are equally distributed, then multiple blocks are
likely. Multiple blocks are more frequent if shareholders are likely to perform independent or
complementary monitoring functions.
This result is supported by our analysis of the optimal ownership structure, and corroborated
by our investigation of upstairs retrading. As pointed out, blockholders will only abstain from
retrading shares if both perform valuable functions for the company. A good proxy for capturing
complementarities in monitoring could be heterogeneity among shareholders, again proxied by
their group adherence. Conversely, if the existence of multiple blocks is observed and blockholders
seem to be fairly similar, this should indicate that equilibrium private benefits are small. If
shareholders are proxied to be more heterogeneous, equilibrium private benefits should be more
substantial.
Evidence consistent with this prediction is provided by Boehmer (2000) in a study of acquisi-
tions by German listed firms. While the presence of a second large shareholder does not generally
improve the quality of the acquisitions (interpreted as a proxy for good investment choices), there
is a beneficial influence if the second blockholder complements a bank as shareholder, or if a bank
complements a family or corporate controlling shareholder.
• A strictly positive fraction of firms should have leading shareholders with equal block size, in
particular if the free float is small.
The equal size of blocks is optimal when there is no diﬀerence in control competence (∆θ =
0) and the diﬀerence in monitoring skills is not too big, in particular if there are few small
shareholders around that might help keep the power of the largest block in check.
• The relative size of the largest block increases in the free float. If the relative size of the con-
trolling block decreases in the free float, then shareholder heterogeneity is more determined
by control-specific competence than by control-independent monitoring skills, and vice versa.
These results have been established in Section 4. The simple observation that the largest
shareholder is in control is less useful as an indicator that monitoring skills are the main determi-
nant of shareholder heterogeneity, since in the retrading-proof ownership structure, the controlling
shareholder always holds the largest block.
• For a high level of investor protection, multiple shareholders should be observed more fre-
quently. The size of the controlling block is decreasing in improvements in investor protec-
tion if the level of investor protection is low, but may be increasing if investor protection
and diﬀerences in control competence are large.
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Note that a system with a poor state of investor protection is a system where the costs of
transform company resources into private resources are small, i.e. γ is small, as in Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2000) and Burkart and Panunzi (2000).
This insight debunks the popular idea that the presence of multiple shareholders may act as
a substitute for poor investor protection (see e.g. LaPorta et al. (1999), p. 502). The flaw in this
idea, from the viewpoint of our analysis, is that it confounds legal protection with the equilibrium
level of deadweight costs. If there is no legal protection (γ = 1), controlling shareholders will
steal, but for every dollar stolen, the company loses only one dollar. As we consider an increase in
γ, this will reduces the equilibrium level of benefits B, but the total waste from benefit extraction
is benefits times γ − 1, a product which increases with protection. So the better is protection,
the more is to be gained from competition among shareholders. This is the reason why we find
robustly an inverse relationship between the size of α1 and γ, whether we look at optimal or
retrading-proof ownership structures.
While the empirical support for this hypothesis seems to be weak, it may at least help to
understand some puzzling evidence as to the presence of second shareholders. LaPorta et al.
(1999) find that the presence of a single large shareholder is strongly more likely with poor
investor protection, but they also find that the probability for the presence of a second large
shareholder is the same in countries with high and with low anti-director rights. And in Europe,
there is no evidence that second or third shareholders are particularly prevalent in countries with
poor investor protection (See Becht and Mayer (2000)).
• Controlling blocks trade at a premium, non-controlling blocks trade at a discount.
The studies of Barclay and Holderness (1991), Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog (2000) and Nico-
dano and Sembenelli (2000) show that while blocks typically trade at a premium, block transfers
at a discount are frequent. Our analysis suggests that discounts are naturally explained since mi-
nority blockholders, unlike dispersed shareholders, spend on monitoring eﬀort, but are unlikely to
reap control benefit. The premium/discount can thus be viewed as a convenient variable whether
eﬀective control was transferred with a share block or not. Similarly, our model contributes to
the prediction of announcement eﬀects: Positive block premia coincide with negative stock price
reactions if the sale is to a less eﬃcient shareholder or the sale is a block merger. Positive block
premia coincide with positive stock price reactions if the sale is to a more eﬃcient shareholder.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate when a seller of a corporation, like an owner bringing a company
public or a government privatizing a state-run firm, would find it desirable to sell share blocks
not just to one, but to several strategic investors. The benefit of having several blockholders is
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seen as limiting rent extraction, in an eﬀort to secure the vote of minority shareholders. If private
benefits are value-destroying, this device to protect minority shareholders is in the interest of the
initial seller.
This model is a preliminary attempt to model corporate governance by explicitly referring
to voting games played in shareholder meetings. We emphasize that the strength in the control
contest is derived from two sources, the competence to run the firm and the voting power. Our
results strongly indicate that empirical research on ownership structure is incomplete if it does not
try to proxy for contestability. To eliminate control rents, the seller should give the smaller share
block to the controlling shareholder, but this may not be the optimal ownership structure from
the point of view of the seller when taking account of monitoring incentives. If only the second
largest block is allocated to the controlling shareholder, then the ownership structure is likely to
be undone through subsequent block trades, and the anticipation of this unraveling would harm
the initial valuation.
We have included only one reason why multiple share blocks may not be mutually sold out
in block mergers, namely complementarity in monitoring services. But there are, in our opinion,
a couple of other mechanisms leading to retrading-proofness, and our model can easily be ac-
commodated to include those, thus giving richer testable hypotheses: (i) Multiple blocks allow a
better risk sharing between large shareholders;22 (ii) the implicit commitment to protect minority
shareholders is attractive for firms that expect to go back to the capital market (firms with high
growth opportunities) in the future; (iii) a second blockholder allows for a contingent shift in
control; (iv) asymmetric information about the firm’s prospects or about private benefits.
Two possible extensions are worth to be explored in future work. First, it is highly desirable
to endogenize the size of the free float, 1 − α¯. We mentioned the idea that stock prices include
a liquidity premium, and it is reasonable to assume that it is an increasing function of the free
float. Such an endogeneization would also allow to explicitly address possible stock purchases or
sales of large stockholders on the downstairs market.
Second, we have assumed that large shareholders remain locked into a contest for control. But
collusion among large shareholders, and even explicit voting pacts and shareholder agreements, are
indeed ubiquitous. While the formal analysis of what makes shareholders compete or collude is in
its infancy, there seems to be some empirical support for the idea that shareholder agreements are
arrangements that may break under stress, to the benefit of shareholder value since competition
arises when it is most needed (see Volpin (2001)). It would be interesting to explore these ideas
in the framework of our contestability model.
22Risk aversion is known to be a major obstacle to the sustainability of large share blocks (Admati, Pfleiderer
and Zechner (1993)).
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Appendix A: Strong Equilibria of the Voting Game
We will establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (i) There exists a unique strong equilibrium of the voting game.
(ii) Suppose that α1 ≥ α2. If ∆θγ +
α1−α2
γ(1−α¯) > B1 − B2, then no small shareholder participates
in the vote, and Shareholder 1 wins the control contest. If ∆θγ +
α1−α2
γ(1−α¯) ≤ B1−B2, then a fraction
α1−α2
1−α¯ of the small shareholders vote, and Shareholder 2 wins the contest.
(iii) Suppose that α2 ≥ α1 and (1−γα2)B2+ γα2B1 ≥ α2∆θ. If α2−α1γ(1−α¯) −
∆θ
γ > B2−B1, then
no small shareholder participates in the vote, and Shareholder 2 wins the contest. If α2−α1γ(1−α¯)−
∆θ
γ ≤
B2−B1, then a fraction α2−α11−α¯ of the small shareholders vote, and Shareholder 1 wins the contest.
(iv) If α2 ≥ α1 and (1 − γα2)B2 + γα2B1 < α2∆θ, no small shareholder participates in the
vote, and Shareholder 1 wins the control contest.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose α1 ≥ α2 and ∆θγ +
α1−α2
γ(1−α¯) > B1−B2. We show that the only
strong equilibrium is the equilibrium where nobody votes. If a fraction ε < α1−α21−α¯ of the small
shareholders vote, their votes do not change the outcome of the control contest, and hence it is a
dominant strategy for them not to vote. If a fraction ε ≥ α1−α21−α¯ of the small shareholders vote, as
γ(B1 −B2)−∆θ < α1−α21−α¯ , there must exist a positive measure δ of small shareholders for whom
κ > γ(B1−B2)−∆θ, and who prefer not to vote. Suppose now that ∆θγ +
α1−α2
γ(1−α¯) ≤ B1−B2. We
show that there is a strong equilibrium where a fraction α1−α21−α¯ of small shareholders with voting
cost κ ≤ γ(B1 −B2)−∆θ participates in the vote. Small shareholders who do not vote have no
incentive to deviate since they already obtain their preferred outcome, and do not incur the voting
cost. If now a measure ε of voting small shareholders chooses to deviate, the outcome of the vote
will be Shareholder 1’s plan, and as κ ≤ γ(B1 − B2)−∆θ for all voting small shareholders, this
will induce a lower payoﬀ . It is clear that there cannot be a strong equilibrium where a larger
fraction of small shareholders chooses to vote, since the non-pivotal voters have an incentive to
deviate. There does not exist a strong equilibrium where no small shareholder votes either, since
a positive measure of shareholders has an incentive to vote, in order to ensure that Shareholder 2
wins the control contest.
Similar arguments show that, when α2 ≥ α1 and (1−γα2)B2+γα2B1 ≥ α2∆θ, the prescribed
strategies form a strong equilibrium of the voting game. Finally, if (1−γα2)B2+γα2B1 < α2∆θ,
all shareholders unanimously prefer Shareholder 1’s plan, and the small shareholders do not vote.
QED.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The competition between the two large shareholders is reminiscent of
a model of Bertrand competition between two firms with diﬀerent marginal costs (see e.g. Shy
(1995), p. 109). Hence, in order to be able solve for an equilibrium in pure strategies, we use the
standard technique of introducing a smallest money unit η. We say that money is continuous if
η = 0 and discrete if η > 0. When money is discrete, the choices of private benefits are B1 = b1η
and B2 = b2η for integer values b1 and b2.
(i) We start with the case α1 ≥ α2 (Figure 3A). Suppose that there exists a discrete money
unit η and that plans are labeled in terms of the money unit, B1 = ηb1 and B2 = ηb2 for integer
values b1 and b2. From Figure 3A, we can divide the plane (B1, B2) into two regions, region A,
where Shareholder 1 wins the control contest, and region B where Shareholder 2 wins the control
contest. We first claim that there cannot be an equilibrium where (B1, B2) belong to region B.
To see this note that, whenever B1 = 0, Shareholder 1 wins the control contest, so that for any
point (B1, B2) in region B, Shareholder 1 has a profitable deviation, B1 = 0. Now consider a
point (B1, B2) in region A, with B1 ≥ B∗1 . As B1 ≥ B∗1 and (B1, B2) belongs to region A, we
must have B2 > 0. By choosing B2 = 0, player 2 wins the control contest. Furthermore, in the
region where B1 ≥ B∗1 , Shareholder 2 prefers to win the control contest, irrespective of the values
of B1 and B2. Hence, Shareholder 2 has a profitable deviation by choosing B2 = 0. Next, consider
a point (B1, B2) in region A, with B2 > 0 and B1 < B∗1 . As Shareholder 1’s utility is increasing in
B1 in region A, B1 must be the maximal private benefit that player 1 can extract while winning
the control contest. In other words, we must have
(b1 + 1)η ≥ b2η +
(α1 − α2)
γ(1− α¯) +
1
γ∆θ . (1)
However, as B1 < B∗1 , we have
b1η <
(α1 − α2)
γ(1− α¯) +
1
γ∆θ . (2)
Clearly, the two inequalities 1 and 2 are inconsistent for any value b2 ≥ 1. Hence, the only
possible equilibrium candidate is given by B2 = 0 and B1 = max{b1η|b1η < (α1−α2)γ(1−α¯) + 1γ∆θ}. These
strategies form an equilibrium, as Shareholder 1 has no incentive to deviate, and Shareholder 2
always loses the control contest and is indiﬀerent among all possible values of B2. As the discrete
money unit converges to zero, the equilibrium converges to (B∗1 , 0).
(ii) Suppose now that α2 ≥ α1 and α2−α11−α¯ ≤
1
1−γα2∆θ (Figure 3B) and suppose that money
is continuous. Consider a point (B1, B2) in the region where Shareholder 2 wins the contest.
As Shareholder 1 always wins the contest by oﬀering B1 = 0, she has a profitable deviation by
choosing B1 = 0. Consider now a point (B1, B2) in the region where Shareholder 1 wins with
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B1 > B∗1 . As B1 > B∗1 , there exists a value B2 such that α2∆θ1−γα2 −
γα2B1
1−γα2 < B2 <
α2−α1
γ(1−α¯) −
∆θ
γ +B1.
Hence, shareholder can win the contest by proposing B2 when Shareholder 1 proposes B1. As
B1 > B∗1 , Shareholder 2 strictly prefers to win the contest, and this deviation is profitable. Now
note that, for any value B1 ≤ B∗1 , Shareholder 1 wins the control contest. Hence any oﬀer B1 < B∗1
is dominated for Shareholder 1 by the oﬀer B∗1 . To finish the proof, note that (B∗1 , B∗2) does indeed
for an equilibrium, as Shareholder 2 has no incentive to deviate (he loses the contest for any value
of B2 when Shareholder 1 proposes B∗1), and Shareholder 1 has no incentive to deviate, as any
value B1 > B∗1 would make Shareholder 2 win the contest.
(iii) Finally suppose that α2 ≥ α1 and α2−α11−α¯ >
1
1−γα2∆θ (Figure 3C) and let money be
labeled in discrete units. This case turns out to be very similar to the case of Figure 3a. We can
again divide the plane (B1, B2) into two regions, region A, where Shareholder 1 wins the control
contest, and region B where Shareholder 2 wins the control contest. Let the smallest money unit
η be small enough so that η < α2−α11−α¯ −
1
1−γα2∆θ. Then, for any possible point (B1, B2) in region
A there exists a deviation for Shareholder 2 which makes her win the control contest, and such
that (1− γα2)B2 + γα2B1 > α2∆θ, i.e. Shareholder 2 strictly prefers to win the contest. Hence,
Shareholder 2 has a profitable deviation and (B1, B2) cannot be an equilibrium. For any point
(B1, B2) in region B with B2 ≥ B∗2 , Shareholder 1 has a profitable deviation, by oﬀering B1 = 0
and winning the contest. Finally, by an argument similar to the argument of the case α1 ≥ α2, a
point (B1, B2) in region B with B2 < B∗2 and B1 > 0 cannot be an equilibrium. Hence the only
possible equilibrium is given by B1 = 0 and B2 = max{b2η|b2η < α2−α1γ(1−α¯) − 1γ∆θ} and it is easy
to see that these strategies indeed form a equilibrium, which converges to (0, B∗2) as the smallest
money unit η goes to zero. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2: We will show that there is a unique point where the joint surplus
U1(α1, α2) + U2(α1, α2) is maximized. Under our assumption α1 > α2, this joint surplus is given
by
U1(α1, α2) + U2(α1, α2) = α¯
³
θ1 +
α¯
c
´
− α
2
1
2c −
(α¯− α1)2
2c + (1− γα¯) min
½
B¯, 2α1 − α¯γ(1− α¯) +
∆θ
γ
¾
.
(i) We assume first that B¯ > α¯γ(1−α¯)+
∆θ
γ (maximum benefit is never attained). Then the objective
function becomes
U1(α1, α2) + U2(α1, α2) = α¯
³
θ1 +
α¯
c
´
− α
2
1
2c −
(α¯− α1)2
2c + (1− γα¯)
µ
2α1 − α¯
γ(1− α¯) +
∆θ
γ
¶
. ,
and the first-order condition gives:
−2α1 − α¯c +
2(1− γα¯)
γ(1− α¯) = 0 ,
or a maximizer of
α1 =
α¯
2
+
c(1− γα¯)
γ(1− α¯) ≡ α
R
1 ,
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Next, notice that U1(α1, α2)+U2(α1, α2) is strictly concave, hence the maximum αR1 is unique.
For all α1 < αR1 , the value of the objective function is strictly increasing in α1, so the corner
solution α¯ is the unique optimum if α¯ < αR1 .
(ii) Second, we consider the case of B¯ < α¯γ(1−α¯) +
∆θ
γ ; then the maximum benefit B¯ may be
attained for α1 < α¯. Define the threshold where this upper limit is reached as
α+1 =
α¯
2
+
1− α¯
2
¡
γB¯ −∆θ
¢
Consider αR1 < α+1 . Then for all α1 > αR1 , the value of the objective function is strictly falling in
α1 and strictly below the value in case (i), hence min{αR1 , α¯} is the unique maximizer. Consider
αR1 > α+1 . Since α+1 > α¯2 , it follows that for all α1 > α
+
1 , the value of the objective function
is falling in α1 and strictly below the value in case (i), hence min{α+1 , α¯} must be the unique
maximizer. QED.
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